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Abstract Using longitudinal social security data, this study finds evidence of weak
real wage cyclicality in Spain throughout 1988–2011. The baseline estimate of a 0.4 %
increase in wages in response to a one percentage point decline in the unemployment
rate lies in the lower bound of available estimates for developed countries. Wage
cyclicality in a rigid labour market like Spain is mainly driven by workers under
temporary contracts and newly-hired workers. I calculate the cyclicality of the net
present value of wages in new matches—the relevant piece of information for firms
posting vacancies, but a rarely available measure—and find that it is well approximated
by the cyclicality of wages for newly-hired workers.
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1 Introduction
Recent evidence on real wage cyclicality using worker-level data shows wages are
much more cyclical than previously thought. Following the lead of Bils (1985), many
studies have found that since the early 1970s individual wages respond to changes in the
unemployment rate [see Pissarides (2009) for a summary of the evidence]. However,
most of this evidence is available for countries with flexible labour markets, mainly
the United States. Even more, in contrast to many countries in Continental Europe,
the European countries for which estimations are available (the United Kingdom,
Germany, Portugal and Italy) do not exhibit a large incidence of wage indexation
policies or centralized collective agreements.
Spain is a suitable scenario to evaluate real wage cyclicality within a much rigid
labour market. The Spanish system of collective bargaining is based on two principles
that deter firms from adjusting wages along the business cycle. The first principle
automatically extends any collective agreement beyond the scope of a firm to all
workers in the same sector and province, even if they had not participated in the
bargaining process. The second principle secures the validity of collective agreements
after their expiration. Likewise, a large share of agreements (more than 60 %) include
indexation clauses which trigger high inertia in firms’ wage-setting decisions. Lastly,
duality in the labour market insulates workers under permanent contracts (around 67–
70 % of the workforce with high levels of employment protection) from business cycle
fluctuations.
I find weak procyclicality of real wages in Spain over the period 1988–2011. My
baseline estimate is a 0.4 % increase in wages in response to a 1 % decline in the
(lagged) unemployment rate. This estimate is the lowest among available estimates,
which usually vary between 1.3 and 1.5 % increase in wages in the United States—
again for a 1 % drop in the unemployment rate—and an even larger increase in wages
between 2.0 and 2.2 % in European countries. When I use total salaries instead of
base salaries for a restricted period in which the former are available, I still obtain a
low level of procyclicality at 0.6 %. Thus, as expected, I find real wage cyclicality
is lower in a country with institutions that hinder firms to respond to business cycle
fluctuations. In this line, this finding indicates that for some European countries with
high-wage indexation and employment protection policies (e.g., Belgium, Austria,
France and Scandinavian countries), wage cyclicality is presumably much lower than
the available European estimates.
To obtain these cyclicality estimates I use a rich social security data set—Muestra
Continua de Vidas Laborales (mcvl). This is an administrative data set that tracks
career histories for a 4 % sample of individuals who in a calendar year have any
relationship with social security. For each individual, all employment and most unem-
ployment spells are available at the daily level since 1981 or entry in social security,
whichever is more recent. Thus, I can construct a monthly panel recording labour
market status, some individual traits, job characteristics and wages.
This unique data set has strong advantages relative to other data sets that have
been used to estimate wage cyclicality. By exploiting the high frequency in the data
I can identify most labour market transitions, specially those that are of particular
interest in the wage cyclicality literature (e.g. estimating cyclicality levels for job
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movers, for workers who start jobs from periods of unemployment or inactivity, or
for workers who remain within an employer–employee match). Such transitions are
not available in surveys with high attrition or are difficult to detect in administra-
tive data sets with longer periodicity. Moreover, I can estimate the cyclicality of the
net present values of wages in new matches over their job duration, which consti-
tutes a key piece of information for the Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching
model.
One drawback in the data set is the intermediate level of censoring in wages. I
propose a simple approach to simulate wages using information on individual and
job characteristics, uncensored wage observations and wage persistence estimated
by exploiting the longitudinal dimension in mcvl. This is by itself one empirical
contribution of the study. In the line of Haider and Solon (2006), I assume uncensored
wages for a worker follow a multivariate log-normal distribution. I estimate using
Tobit regressions the mean and variance of wages in each period. To approximate
wage correlation coefficients between any two periods I develop an indirect inference
approach. Lastly, I simulate wages only for censored observations and evaluate the fit
of the simulation by comparing these simulated wages to total salaries available from
income tax return data for a restricted period. Overall, the fit of the simulation is quite
satisfactory.
This study contributes to the wage cyclicality literature in several aspects. First,
as already mentioned, unlike wage cyclicality estimates for countries with flexible
labour markets, this study provides one estimate for a rigid labour market scenario.
Second, the study shows how wage cyclicality responds in a setting with high duality
in employment protection. I find cyclicality for workers under temporary contracts
is twice as large as for workers under permanent contracts. Thus, temporary workers
carry most of the burden of wage adjustments along the cycle, while permanent work-
ers are much less affected. Third, I present evidence of wage cyclicality decreasing
consistently with the level of job tenure. I find cyclicality is much higher for newly-
hired workers (those who start jobs from periods of unemployment or inactivity) than
for job stayers with high levels of tenure. The availability of employer identifiers
allows to calculate tenure levels with high precision and to estimate cyclicality within
an employer–employee match as in Devereux (2001).
The estimated difference in wage cyclicality between newly-hired workers and job
stayers is relevant for the empirical validity of the Mortensen-Pissarides search and
matching model (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994; Pissarides 2000). The model has
been challenged on its ability to match the observed cyclicality on vacancies and
unemployment. Some studies have suggested wage rigidity as a potential solution to
this so called unemployment-volatility puzzle (Hall 2005; Shimer 2005). In this model,
the cyclicality of the net present value of wages in new matches is a key statistic to
determine job creation (Pissarides 2009). I estimate such cyclicality for the net present
value of wages in new matches and obtain a similar estimate for wages of newly-hired
workers. This result, the first using actual data on monthly wages and job durations, is
encouraging since the net present values of wages is rarely observed and impossible to
calculate in most data sets. Overall, this finding does not give support to wage rigidity
as a solution to the unemployment-volatility puzzle.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews some institutional
aspects of the Spanish labour market. Section 3 describes the data and the approach
developed to simulate wages for censored observations. Section 4 explains the esti-
mation methodology. Section 5 presents the results. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes.
2 Institutional aspects of the Spanish labour market
In this section I highlight some features of the Spanish labour market that influence the
response of wages to changes in economic conditions throughout the period 1988–
2011. In particular, I focus on the system of collective bargaining and the duality
in labour market contracts. The combination of these two factors makes Spain an
interesting scenario to examine wage cyclicality.1
The Spanish system of collective bargaining follows the principles established in
the 1980 Workers’ Statute, which experienced only minor changes since its adoption
until the recent labour market reform in 2012. Two main principles govern the Statute.
First, the principle of automatic effectiveness states that any collective agreement of a
higher level than a firm agreement is immediately extended to all firms and workers in
the same sector and province. Workers do not need to be affiliated with a union or to
participate in the bargaining process. Second, the ultra-activity principle guarantees
the permanent validity of collective agreements after their expiration. Moreover, if the
terms on a new agreement are less beneficial to workers than on the earlier one, then
the new agreement can not be endorsed.
The system of collective bargaining in Spain can be characterized by its large
scope, intermediate degree of centralization, substantial inertia in wage indexation
and homogeneity in wage setting decisions. The rate of coverage reaches more than
80 % of private sector workers despite a low rate of unionization below 15 %. This
disparity in rates is sustained, of course, by the principle of automatic effectiveness.
The bargaining process takes place mainly at the sectoral level within a provincial
scope—only less than 15 % of workers are subject to a firm agreement, which are
frequent in large firms and negligible in firms with fewer than 200 workers. The high
rate of inertia in wages is reflected in the large share of agreements (between 60
and 70 %) that incorporate indexation clauses. Collective agreements last around 2.5
years—a long duration similar to those of Scandinavian countries—and include annual
wage setting policies and protection clauses in case of deviations from the inflation
rate of reference.
All these features of the Spanish system of collective bargaining do not contribute
to the adjustment of wages and employment levels to macroeconomic conditions
or the evolution of labour demand and supply. In fact, several studies find a high
1 See Estrada and Izquierdo (2005) for a review of institutional aspects of the labour market. Bentolila et al.
(2010) provide a recent description of the Spanish system of collective agreement. Dolado et al. (2002)
analyze the causes and characteristics of labour market duality in Spain. The recent labour market reforms
of 2010 and 2012 escape the period of analysis. Most of the changes resulting from these reforms started to
take place in 2011 and specially after. More recent waves of data will help examine whether these reforms
substantially affected the level of real wage cyclicality in Spain.
123
SERIEs (2014) 5:173–195 177
incidence of nominal and real wage rigidities in Spain.2 Most of them exploit micro-
data from the Wage Dynamics Network (wdn) survey—a project sponsored by the
European Central Bank that records information on the determinants of price and
wage setting decisions by European firms. In this survey the share of Spanish firms
that have frozen wages in the past 5 years is only 2.4 %, a share four times lower than
the European average (9.6 %). Likewise, a substantial share of firms (55 %) apply
an automatic indexation mechanism, a fraction three times larger than the European
average (17 %). Cuadrado et al. (2011), using the same data set on wages as in this
study but a different methodology, find evidence of a high level of real wage rigidity
in Spain. In fact, their findings indicate Spain ranks fifth among 17 oecd countries
only after Belgium, Sweden, Finland and France.
The duality in the Spanish labour market is the result of two hiring mechanisms
with different firing costs. On one hand, workers under permanent contracts benefit
from a high level of employment protection through generous severance payments and
legal defense in case of a firing event. On the other hand, workers under temporary
contracts have much lower severance payments and do not face legal proceedings
when the contract expires. As a result, in this dual labour market, workers in permanent
contracts (around 67–70 %) enjoy high protection and bargaining power, while workers
in temporary contracts earn lower wages and suffer from high turnover rates and low
levels of job tenure.3
This dual labour market and the restrictions imposed by a stringent system of col-
lective bargaining hinder firms to react to changes in economic conditions by adjusting
wages.4 Workers under permanent contracts benefit from wage indexation policies and
high firing costs. Therefore, it is not surprising that temporary workers take most of
the burden of labour market adjustments. According to the wdn survey, when Spanish
firms were asked about ways to reduce costs in response to potential demand shocks, a
notable share of 58 % responded they would adjust by reducing temporary employment
while only 10 % by lowering wages (Izquierdo and Cuadrado 2009). The correspond-
ing averages across firms in European countries show that only 22 % of firms would
react by reducing employment and 13 % by lowering wages (Bentolila et al. 2010).
2 Nominal (downward) wage rigidities arise when there is a low incidence of wage cuts, while real (down-
ward) wage rigidities are induced by institutional mechanisms that generate wage increments of the same
order as inflation. Holden and Wulfsberg (2008) find no significant evidence of nominal wage cuts in
Spain using industry-level wage data for 19 oecd countries during the period 1973–1999. Babecký et al.
(2010) show wages in Spain exhibit both nominal and real (downward) rigidities using data from the Wage
Dynamics Network survey in the years 2007–2008.
3 The rise in the share of temporary workers induced the government to implement reforms to mitigate
the 1984 labour market liberalization policy. In 1994, the government toughened some rules for the use of
temporary contracts and expanded the array of reasons for job dismissal. This reform had no effect in the
aggregate share of temporary workers. Furthermore, in 1997, another reform introduced a new permanent
contract with lower firing costs and social security contribution (such contract was extended and amplified
in a later reform in 2001). According to Dolado et al. (2002) the net effect was a small decline in the share
of temporary workers.
4 The recent labour market reforms limited the ultra-activity principle, increased decentralization of collec-
tive agreements at the firm level, decreased firing costs, and reduced workers’ bargaining power by giving
firms economic reasons to reduce wages. Yet, the reforms did not tackle specifically the high level of duality
in the Spanish labour market.
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3 Data
The main data set used in the study is Spain’s Continuous Sample of Employment
Histories (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales or mcvl). This administrative data
set is a 4 % non-stratified random draw of the population of individuals related with
the social security system in a calendar year. Individuals can either be working as
employees or self-employeds, receiving unemployment benefits or receiving a pension.
The mcvl records all changes in labour market status and job characteristics for each
individual in the sample since 1981 or entry in social security, whichever is more
recent. I combine seven editions of the mcvl in order to obtain a 4 % sample of all
individuals who appear in social security records at any time throughout 2005–2011.
Individuals enter the sample based on their anonymized social security number
and remain in subsequent editions. Each new mcvl wave adds individuals who first
enter the labour market and losses those who were deceased or left the country in the
previous calendar year (those who stopped working remain in the sample while they
receive unemployment benefits, disability benefits or a retirement pension). The unit
of observation in the source data records the starting and ending date for any change
in the individual’s labour market status or job characteristics (including changes in
occupation or remuneration within the same firm). Therefore, as long as an individual
registers one day of activity with social security in any calendar year between 2005–
2011, her complete working life history can be recovered up to 1981.
I construct for all workers monthly working life histories including their labour
market status, daily wages, and some individual and main job characteristics.5 For
every job spell I know the number of working days in each month, the type of occu-
pation and contract (permanent or temporary, full-time or part-time), the 3-digit nace
sector of economic activity, and whether the individual is self-employed, a private
sector employee or a public sector worker.6 Some individual characteristics like age
and gender are provided while other individual variables such as level of education
and country of birth are obtained from the Padrón or Municipal Register.
Monthly wages are available for all workers but some observations are censored.
These wages correspond to base salaries and do not include overtime, commissions
or bonuses.7 I calculate daily wages by dividing monthly wages by the number of
working days in each month. Later in this section, I explain in detail how I simulate
daily wages only for capped observations exploiting the panel dimension in the mcvl
and data on uncensored wage observations and individual and job characteristics. I
build detailed measures of cumulative labour market experience by adding up the
actual number of working days in each month. Similarly, I construct a measure of job
5 In months when individuals become unemployed, I classify them as such if the amount of daily unem-
ployment benefits exceeds the amount of daily wages in the same month. Likewise, I identify the main job
as the job with the highest daily wage (and highest number of working days in case of a tie).
6 Employers assign workers into one of ten social security occupation categories. These categories aim
to proxy the skills required by the job and not necessarily those acquired by the worker. Employers were
required to report information on contractual conditions for all workers since 1996.
7 According to García-Pérez (2008) and Cuadrado et al. (2011) mcvl base salaries or contributions to
social security are a good proxy of total salaries for a large share of the population of workers.
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tenure at the establishment location. This is possible since legislation forces employers
to keep separate earnings’ contribution accounting codes for each province in which
they conduct business. Unfortunately, employers do not need to keep a unique firm
identifier across provinces; hence, I cannot build a second measure of job tenure at the
firm level.8
This rich administrative data set has special advantages over other data sets that
have been used to estimate wage cyclicality. First, its large coverage makes it a rep-
resentative sample of the Spanish labour force, as opposed to smaller surveys such
as the psid or the nlsy for the United States.9 Second, its daily frequency allows for
the accurate identification of most labour market transitions, including moves to new
jobs for workers who come from unemployment or periods of inactivity, job moves
between firms for continuously employed workers, and long-term separations into
unemployment or inactivity. These transitions are not easy to detect in annual data
sets or surveys with high levels of attrition. Third, the presence of an establishment
identifier makes it possible to construct precise measures of job tenure at this level and
to estimate wage cyclicality within a job or employer–employee match. Finally, it is
also possible to calculate the present value of wages in a new match, a key statistic for
job creation in the canonical search and matching model. In fact, this is the first study
that calculates such present values using actual data on job durations and wages.
Sample restrictions
The initial sample is a monthly data set of men born between 1929 and 1991 who
have worked at any time between January 1988 and December 2011 (i.e., aged 20–60
during this period). I also compute wage cyclicality estimates for women and for all
workers, but focus mostly on the results for males given the availability of estimates
for other countries.10 I exclude periods of unemployment and spells workers spent
as self-employed because wages and the number of working days are self-reported
and, hence, less reliable.11 A total of 599,307 individuals and 67,335,705 monthly
observations make up this initial sample.
From this initial sample, I drop observations with non-contributory occupations
and missing values of occupation and establishment location, and drop individuals
for whom educational attainment is missing. These restrictions reduce the sample to
549,350 individuals and 64,029,103 monthly observations. Then, I eliminate the years
8 Thus, it is not possible to include firm fixed-effects in the estimation of real wage cyclicality as in recent
studies. Carneiro et al. (2012) argue that the composition and behaviour of firms might vary along different
phases of the cycle, i.e., not only firms that enter or exit activity during the cycle are a selected sample, but
also firms’ wage-setting policies might change throughout the cycle.
9 García-Pérez (2008) tabulates worker characteristics for mcvl and for the Spanish Labour Force Survey
(epa) and finds similar population magnitudes.
10 I set 1988 as the initial year because prior to it job tenure is left-censored—recall it can be measured
since 1981. Still, as I show later in the results, when I estimate wage cyclicality for workers with high levels
of job tenure, I group workers with more than 6 years of tenure into a single category.
11 I also eliminate apprenticeships and job spells in agriculture, fishing, mining and household activities
since non-pecuniary payments are more prevalent in these activities and the number of working days is
again self-reported. These spells account only for 8.2 % of the sample at this stage.
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in which individuals show low labour force attachment, i.e. those calendar years where
individuals with less than 1 year of job tenure work less than 1 month or where individ-
uals with more than 1 year of job tenure work less than 1 quarter. After this restriction
the sample contains 538,073 individuals and 62,843,952 monthly observations.
I further restrict the sample to full-time job spells in the private sector. Earnings
in the public sector are heavily regulated by the national and regional governments
and only a small subset of male workers are under a part-time contract (5 % percent
of observations at this stage). This leaves the final sample at 513,058 individuals and
56,107,014 monthly observations.
Job tenure categories
I define two job tenure classifications based on establishment identifiers. In the first
classification I count the number of working days accumulated in an establishment
throughout a worker’s career. When the worker switches jobs the level of job tenure
resets to zero in the new establishment. If he later returns to an earlier job or estab-
lishment, the tenure count starts from its former level, i.e., the level of tenure when he
left that job. In the second classification a return to a previous job or establishment is
considered a new spell. Thus, by construction job tenure levels can not exceed those
in the former classification. More important, the first tenure classification allows to
estimate the cyclicality of wages for workers within a match, i.e., for those workers
who start a job and have not worked in the firm before.
For each job tenure classification I construct six tenure categories. I divide work-
ers who start a new job into newly-hireds—those who come from periods of unem-
ployment or inactivity—and job-movers—those who change jobs in two consecutive
months. Workers remain under these categories during their first year of tenure.12 The
other tenure categories are the following: 1–2, 2–4, 4–6 years and more than 6 years.
Column (1) in Table 1 shows the share of observations in each tenure category
under both classifications. Newly-hireds and job-movers account for at least 25 % of
all observations while workers with more than 4 years of job tenure comprise a greater
share above 41 %. The share of observations in the first year of tenure is larger than
in other countries. For instance, this share accounts for 16.4 % of annual observations
in Portugal throughout 1986–2007 (Carneiro et al. 2012).13 This polarization in the
level of job tenure mirrors the duality in the Spanish labour market referred to in the
previous section. Column (2) reveals that the use of temporary contracts is predominant
12 I have been extremely careful in identifying these two job tenure categories. Given the high frequency
in the mcvl data, one can often find jobs with very short durations (e.g. less than a week). I exclude all
jobs that last less than one month since they are likely to involve piecework or are unusual in the working
lives of most individuals. Also, I can not classify all job starts appropriately. In few cases a worker may
start a job, leave it for a while (e.g. 2 months) and return later. I leave out all jobs in which a worker does
not remain in the establishment during the first two months, so that he is not classified as newly-hired or
job-mover during his first year of tenure, but can possibly be classified into other tenure categories as he
remains in the job.
13 Using a similar method to identify newly-hired workers, Haefke et al. (2013) report that the share of
newly-hireds represents around 8 % of the total number of workers in the United States in an average quarter
between 1979 and 2006.
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Newly-hireds 11.6 82.0 1,244
Job-movers 13.1 65.4 1,422
1–2 years 13.9 47.2 1,448
2–4 years 17.5 27.0 1,571
4–6 years 11.2 16.1 1,717
More than 6 years 32.8 5.6 2,115
Classification 2
Newly-hireds 14.8 82.2 1,252
Job-movers 12.8 64.6 1,428
1–2 years 14.1 43.0 1,473
2–4 years 17.0 21.7 1,621
4–6 years 10.6 11.3 1,783
More than 6 years 30.6 3.7 2,159
Variables are sample means or medians throughout 1988–2011, except for the share of workers under
temporary contract which is restricted to the period 1996–2011. The numbers of monthly observations for
classification 1 and 2 of job tenure categories are 54,883,039 and 54,067,567, respectively. Monthly wages
are expressed in December 2011 euros
among workers who start a job—greater than 82 % for newly-hireds and somewhat
lower for job-movers at 65 %.14 This high incidence of temporary work may increase
turnover rates in the labour market and generate dispersion in job durations of new
matches—in the sample, using the first tenure classification, the 25th percentile and
the median of the distribution of job duration of new matches are quite low at 4 and 9
months, respectively, while the mean and 75th percentile are much larger at 25 and 27
months, respectively. Column (3) also highlights large raw wage differentials among
job tenure categories.
Simulating wages for censored observations
The mcvl reports data on monthly wages throughout 1988–2011, but these are cen-
sored for some workers. In particular, 16.1 and 1.5 % of daily wage observations are
top- and bottom-coded, respectively (recall I divide monthly wages by the total num-
14 When I restrict the newly-hired category only to the first three months of job tenure instead of the
first year, the incidence of temporary contracts among newly-hireds increases to 88 %. Therefore, between
1996 and 2011, almost nine out of ten new jobs for workers coming from periods of unemployment or
inactivity were set under a temporary contract. The incidence of temporary contracts also increases to 73 %
for job-movers when I restrict this category only to the first three months.
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ber of working days in each month). In this subsection I explain how I simulate daily
wages for the 17.6 % of observations that are censored.
Censoring bounds vary by type of occupation on an annual basis. Since these
bounds are not available in the mcvl, I gathered annual bulletins from Spain’s official
newspaper Boletín Oficial del Estado (boe) which document censoring bounds for each
type of occupation. I checked consistency of these bounds by plotting monthly wage
densities in mcvl for each occupation in a given year. Overall, censored observations
in mcvl can be easily detected using the information from the boe bulletins.
Subsequently, I estimate 960 Tobit regressions by groups of age, occupation and
year (4 age groups × 10 types of occupation × 24 years) in which the dependent
variable is log daily wages expressed in December 2011 euros. I define four age groups
in 10-year-age intervals between 20 and 60. As explanatory variables I include age and
sets of indicator variables for gender, level of education, temporary contract, part-time
contract, province of workplace, and month. Given that my baseline model to estimate
wage cyclicality incorporates a worker fixed-effect, this imputation should reflect an
individual-specific component of the wage. Following Card et al. (2013) on their wage
imputation for German social security data, I exploit the panel dimension in the mcvl
by including the worker’s mean of log daily wages over his career (excluding the
current wage) and the fractions of top or bottom censored wage observations over his
career (again excluding the current censoring status). I calculate daily top and bottom
censoring bounds by dividing monthly bounds by the number of calendar days in each
month. Daily wages that exceed daily censoring bounds are flagged as top-coded and
viceversa.
After these Tobit estimations, I simulate daily wages for censored observations as
follows:
Wˆi j t = xi j t ′γˆ + σˆ εi j t , (1)
where Wˆi j t is the simulated log daily wage for individual i in occupation j at year t ,
xi j t is a vector of individual and job characteristics including the mean of log daily
wages and the fraction of censored wage observations in all other periods, γˆ and σˆ
are estimated parameters, and εi j t is an i.i.d shock. However, as shown by studies
that exploit data on career-long earnings histories, earnings exhibit great persistence
(Bjorklund 1993; Haider and Solon 2006). Thus, I exploit again the panel dimension
in the mcvl to introduce persistence in wage shocks.
To this end I follow the methodology proposed by Haider and Solon (2006). The
main assumption is that the joint distribution of uncensored log daily wages for an
individual is multivariate normal. Hence, wages throughout the period of interest
1988–2011 can be fully characterized by the mean and variance of log daily wages in
each period—estimated in Eq. (1)—and the cross-year autocorrelations of log daily
wages for every pair of years.15 Haider and Solon (2006) estimate autocorrelations
between pairs of years using a bivariate Tobit maximum-likelihood estimator. Instead,
I use a more simple approach based on indirect inference to compute cross-year auto-
correlations.
15 Log daily wages follow a multivariate normal distribution also within each of the ten occupation cate-
gories. For simplicity and from now on I omit index j referring to type of occupation.
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The approach can be summarized in four steps. First, I estimate a regression coef-
ficient for every pair of (standardized) log daily wages of the same worker i in two
different years. This estimation is carried out only for uncensored wage observations.
I label this regression coefficient λˆ∗.16
Second, I exploit the multivariate normality assumption to generate log daily wages
for worker i in year t + h conditional on his observed wage in year t , the relevant
censoring daily bounds and a value for the correlation coefficient ρ. Equation (2)
shows how to generate wages in year t + h based on a bivariate normal distribution
of wages in years t and t + h:







































where W˜it are the standardized uncensored log daily wages for individual i in year
t , ρ is the correlation coefficient, and a˜t+h and b˜t+h are the standardized lower and
upper daily bounds applicable in year t + h, respectively. Since the only unknown in
E(W˜i,t+h) is the value of ρ—the cross-year autocorrelation of interest—based on a
grid of 40 values of ρ from 0 to 0.975 on 0.025 intervals, I generate E(W˜i,t+h | ρ = ρk )
where k = 1, . . . , 40.
Third, I regress each generated E(W˜i,t+h | ρ = ρk ) on W˜it only for uncensored obser-
vations and obtain a regression coefficient λˆk . The optimal value of the cross-year
autocorrelation ρ∗k is the ρk which minimizes the absolute distance between λˆ∗ and
any λˆk . Thus, if log daily wages for worker i follow a multivariate normal distribution,
I choose the ρ∗k that best replicates the observed correlation for uncensored daily wages
in the data. I construct variance-covariance matrices (24 × 24) for each occupation
with the optimal ρ∗k values calculated for every pair of years throughout 1988–2011.
Finally, I simulate wages only for censored observations as follows:
Wˆi j t = xi j t ′γˆ + σˆ · pˆ j t ′ξi j t , (3)
where all variables are the same as in Eq. (1), but now pˆ j t is a row vector (1 × 24)
of the Cholesky decomposition of the estimated variance-covariance matrix and ξi j t
is a vector of random shocks. Since I know whether daily wages are originally top- or
16 To take advantage of the monthly frequency of wages in the mcvl data, for every pair of years I regress
daily wages (monthly wages divided by the number of working days) for the same worker in a given month.
For example, I regress daily wages for worker i in May 1998 on daily wages for worker i in May 1997.
Thus, an individual who works throughout the calendar year contributes with twelve observations to the
estimation of the regression coefficient. This approach does not lose any valuable information in the data.
From now on, all references to a particular year t refer to all the months where individual i works in year t .
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bottom-coded, I force simulated wages to be above or below the corresponding bound,
respectively.17
The fit of the simulation can be tested for the period 2004–2011 in which uncensored
earnings from income tax data have been merged to mcvl. These earnings include all
labour income (salaries plus overtime and bonuses) and are matched to mcvl based
on both employee and employer identifiers separately for every job in a calendar year.
Average daily job earnings can be obtained by dividing annual labour job earnings
by the number of working days in that job in a calendar year obtained from mcvl.
The Appendix presents details on the fit of the simulation. In general, I am able to
match the shape of the upper tail of the earnings distribution, even for the group of
high-skilled workers who are top-coded beyond the 52nd percentile. Moreover, the
degree of persistence observed in labour earnings is remarkably similar to the one I
obtain in the mcvl after simulating censored observations. These results increase the
odds that the distribution of simulated daily wages can accurately approximate the
distribution of actual daily labour earnings in the period 1988–2003.
4 Estimation methodology
In order to estimate wage cyclicality I use a level wage equation of the following form:
ln wi t = αi + xit ′β + δ1 Ut + δ2 T + i t , (4)
where ln wi t is the log real daily wage of worker i in period t (a year-month pair), αi
is a worker fixed-effect, xit are individual and job characteristics, Ut is the national
civilian unemployment rate (used as a cyclical variable), T is a linear time-trend and
i t is the error term with zero mean and constant variance. The previous literature
has emphasized the need to address composition bias resulting from various types of
individuals working in different phases of the business cycle (Solon et al. 1994). To this
end, I introduce worker fixed-effects to capture time-invariant unobserved individual
heterogeneity.
The most common solution used to address such composition bias has been to
estimate a wage regression in first differences (Bils 1985; Solon et al. 1994; Shin
1994; Devereux 2001; Devereux and Hart 2006). However, this strategy restricts the
sample to individuals who work in two consecutive periods—or years given that most
studies are based on annual or bi-annual surveys. For this reason, studies that estimate
wage cyclicality for newly-hired workers—or any group of workers with weak labour
force attachment—run a wage equation in levels (Carneiro et al. 2012; Haefke et al.
2013; Kudlyak 2013). By following this approach, I can exploit the full sample of
17 In particular, if kb = [(bi j t − xi j t ′γˆ )/σˆ ], where  represents the standard normal density, bi j t is the
daily wage level at which top censoring occurs and u ∼ U [0, 1] is a uniform random variable, then I define
ξ = −1[kb + u × (1 − kb)]. Likewise, if ka = [(ai j t − xi j t ′γˆ )/σˆ ], where ai j t is the daily wage level
at which bottom censoring occurs, then I define ξ = −1[ka × u]. This procedure does not necessarily
makes all censored earnings to be above or below the corresponding bounds—given the presence of pˆ j t
in Eq. (3)—, yet empirically, only 0.99 % and 0.76 % of wage observations remain top and bottom-coded,
respectively.
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workers including job stayers, newly-hired workers and job-movers. Also, given the
high frequency in the data and the sample restrictions considered, all individuals appear
more than once, so I do not lose observations when introducing worker fixed-effects.18
In the specification of Eq. (4) the standard error of the estimated coefficient of
interest, δ1, is substantially underestimated in the presence of a year-specific error,
since all workers in period t face the same level of unemployment (Moulton 1986).
For this reason, like in previous studies (Solon et al. 1994; Shin 1994; Devereux 2001),
I adopt a two-stage estimation method and transform the specification in Eq. (4) in the
following two equations:
ln wi t = αi + xit ′β +
T∑
t=1
ηt Dt + ψi t , (5)
ηˆt = θ1 Ut + θ2 T + υt . (6)
Equation (5) now includes a set of indicator variables ηt for each year-quarter pair—
wages are observed monthly but the unemployment rate is at the quarterly level—that
capture in an unrestricted way all temporal variation in wages net of observed and
(time-invariant) unobserved individual characteristics. In the second stage, Eq. (6), I
regress the estimated year-quarter indicators ηˆt on the unemployment rate and a linear
time trend. Therefore, the standard error of the new coefficient of interest, θ1, is now
free from the aggregate bias present in Eq. (4).19
The cyclicality coefficient θ1 measures the semi-elasticity of wages with respect
to the unemployment rate. Most studies using micro-data on wages use the unem-
ployment rate as the preferred proxy of the economic cycle, following the lead of
Bils (1985). A negative estimated value for θ1 would indicate wages are procyclical.
I multiply log wages by 100 so that θ1 approximates the percentage change in wages
in response to a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate.
5 Results
Baseline estimates of wage cyclicality
I begin by estimating the two-stage method described in Eqs. (5) and (6) for different
groups. In the first stage I regress log daily wages (deflated using the Consumer Price
Index and expressed in December 2011 euros) on worker fixed-effects, quartics of
experience and job tenure, an indicator for temporary contract and a set of occupation
18 Note that given the monthly frequency in the data I could still estimate cyclicality for newly-hired
workers using first differences. In this setup, I would be restricting the sample to those who are currently
working, were employed in the same quarter during the past year, but faced periods of unemployment or
inactivity before entering the current job. Still, I rather prefer to estimate wage cyclicality in levels using
the full sample.
19 One alternative is to estimate Eq. (4) using robust-clustered standard errors by year-quarter. However,
when worker fixed-effects are introduced this is not plausible as workers are observed in different periods.
Carneiro et al. (2012) provide a simple method to obtain standard errors in a one-step estimation.
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(1) Sample: male workers −0.379 (0.043)∗∗∗ 56,107,014
(2) Sample: all workers −0.332 (0.043)∗∗∗ 83,151,939
(3) Sample: female workers −0.221 (0.048)∗∗∗ 27,044,925
(4) Sample: male workers −0.399 (0.077)∗∗∗ 46,131,112
Each coefficient is a separate second stage regression of the estimated year-quarter coefficients on the
yearly-lagged quarterly unemployment rate. All second stage regressions have 96 quarterly observations
(1988:1 to 2011:4) and include a constant term, a linear time trend and quarter indicators. In row (4) the first
stage regression is in first-differences and the second stage regresses the estimated year-quarter coefficients
on the lagged annual change in the quarterly unemployment rate (92 observations). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels
indicators and year-quarter indicators.20 In the second stage I regress the estimated
year-quarter indicator coefficients on the yearly-lagged quarterly unemployment rate,
a linear time trend and quarter indicators. I include the lagged unemployment rate
given that in Spain most wages are set 1 year in advance.21 I report only results for the
coefficient of interest, θ1, the semi-elasticity of real wages with respect to the (lagged)
unemployment rate.
Row (1) in Table 2 shows evidence of weak real wage procyclicality for men in
Spain. A one percentage point decline in the unemployment rate is associated with
a small increase in real wages of 0.38 %. In row (4) I estimate wage cyclicality for
men but using first-differences in both stages, as in Solon et al. (1994) and Devereux
(2001). Cyclicality increases only marginally and is not statistically different from the
baseline estimate in row (1). I have also carried out alternative second stage estimations
by using the unemployment rate for men, including a quadratic trend, using other lags
of unemployment or estimating a one-stage specification as in Eq. (4). The semi-
elasticity varies little within a range from 0.372 to 0.391.
Figure 1 plots the relationship between year-quarter coefficients (solid line) and
the yearly-lagged quarterly unemployment rate (dashed line). Specifically, the left
axis shows the residuals of a regression of the estimated year-quarter coefficients on
a linear trend and quarter indicators. A clear negative relationship holds between both
variables during the initial years until the early 2000s when the (detrended) year-
20 I use this set of regressors in all other estimations. I have also included 3-digit nace sector indicators and
province workplace indicators with minor differences in the second stage results. Unless stated otherwise,
I always use the first job tenure definition (a worker keeps his level of job tenure when he returns to a prior
establishment).
21 As stated in Sect. 2, collective agreements may last several years but include annual wage setting
policies. Using firm-level data from the Wage Dynamics Network (wdn) Project, Babecký et al. (2010)
report that firm-level indexation in Spain is widespread and often automatic (around 55 % of firms apply
some automatic indexation mechanism, the second largest share after Belgium). Likewise, using the same
survey, Druant et al. (2012) document that 84 % of firms in Spain change wages only once a year (the
second largest share among the 15 European countries examined).
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Fig. 1 Year-quarter coefficients and lagged unemployment rate
quarter coefficients become flat and stop responding to the falling levels of (lagged)
unemployment. The decline of wages during this last recession is substantial and pre-
sumably would be larger when more recent years are considered. To test for differential
responses of real wages to positive and negative changes in the unemployment rate, I
modify the second stage and estimate annual changes in the year-quarter coefficients
on positive and negative (lagged) changes in the quarterly unemployment rate, a linear
trend and quarter indicators. Confirming the patterns observed in Fig. 1, I find that real
wages respond to positive changes in the lagged unemployment rate (semi-elasticity of
−0.482, s.e. 0.113) but do not respond to negative changes in the unemployment rate
(semi-elasticity of −0.136, s.e. 0.194).
Similar to previous studies [see Solon et al. (1994)], the estimate in row (3) of
Table 2 indicates that the degree of cyclicality for women is much lower at 0.26 %
(the difference with the men cyclicality estimate being significant at the 5 % level).
One potential explanation is that women in Spain may have a more elastic short-run
labour supply than men, so that they experience more employment variation along the
cycle and less variation in wages.22 In fact, compositional bias seems to matter more
for women than for men. When I estimate Eqs. (5) and (6) without including worker
fixed-effects and occupation indicators in the first stage, the semi-elasticity for men
drops from 0.379 to 0.292 while for women the drop is much larger from 0.221 to
0.054 losing statistical significance. Therefore, the skill composition of women varies
more along the cycle so that presumably low-skilled women are more affected by
unemployment during the low phases.
The level of real wage cyclicality I find is not far from the one obtained by Bentolila
et al. (2010). Using micro-data on collective agreements over the period 1990–2007
22 One indicator that points in this direction is the substantial difference in the fractions of women (25.8 %)
and men (6.3 %) under a part-time contract between 1996 and 2011.
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they estimate a regression of nominal wage increments on the lagged annual changes
of the regional unemployment rate and sectoral productivity, and the inflation rate
(considering positive and negative deviations from the rate of reference). They also
include some characteristics of collective agreements as controls. They find that a one
percentage point decline in the unemployment rate is related to an increase of wages
of 0.24 %, but only for newly-signed agreements.
The estimated level of real wage cyclicality (0.38 %) is by far the lowest among
studies that use worker-level data for developed countries. Pissarides (2009) summa-
rizes results of most available studies. For the United States a drop of one percentage
point in the unemployment rate is correlated with a real wage increment of 1.3–1.5 %.
For European countries (United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Portugal) the estimated
real wage cyclicality is even greater at 2.0–2.2 %. However, based on the results of
the International Wage Flexibility Project and the Bank of Spain [(see Cuadrado et al.
(2011)], none of these European countries exhibits a high degree of real wage rigidity.
Spain ranks fifth in such ranking after countries with extensive wage indexation (Bel-
gium, Sweden, Finland and France), while countries such as Germany and Italy have
low levels of real wage rigidity.23 Therefore, the fact that estimated levels of real wage
cyclicality in Europe are higher than initially expected may be driven by the selected
pool of countries for which estimations are available.
Wage cyclicality for selected samples
One potential reason for the low level of real wage cyclicality I find is the use of
base salaries. If firms compensate workers during expansions by offering bonuses
aside from the base salary (Devereux, 2001), then the baseline estimate would be a
lower bound.24 For this reason I estimate real wage cyclicality using total salaries (all
labour income) from income tax data for the period 2004–2011. Although the period
is relatively short, it exhibits enough quarterly variation in wages and unemployment
as it coincides with a period of economic expansion and the great recession. Rows
(1) and (2) in Table 3 indicate that the semi-elasticity of wages with respect to the
unemployment rate is larger when using total salaries (0.61 vs. 0.46). If I extrapolate
my baseline estimate of 0.38 over the period 1988–2011, then the new estimate of real
wage cyclicality is around 0.50. Still, it reflects a much lower level of cyclicality than
in other countries.
Row (3) in Table 3 estimates real wage cyclicality using only uncensored wages
in mcvl and, hence, excludes mainly those workers in the upper tail of the wage
distribution. The lower estimate obtained (0.31) suggests that real wages are more
cyclical for high-skilled workers. Both low- and high-skilled workers benefit from
wage setting policies in collective agreements, but the latter may profit more during
23 See also Dickens et al. (2007); Babecký et al. (2010).
24 Workers and firms may agree to also increase the number of hours of work and, hence, the relevant
wage measure becomes the hourly wage rate including overtime. Unfortunately, the mcvl does not provide
information on the number of working hours.
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(1) Sample: total salaries −0.608 (0.043)∗∗∗ 2004:1–2011:4 20,521,457
(2) Sample: base salaries −0.464 (0.056)∗∗∗ 2004:1–2011:4 22,981,470
(3) Sample: uncensored base salaries −0.306 (0.042)∗∗∗ 1988:1–2011:4 46,264,191
(4) Sample: permanent contract −0.274 (0.046)∗∗∗ 1996:1–2011:4 41,487,318
(5) Sample: temporary contract −0.572 (0.037)∗∗∗ 1996:1–2011:4 14,619,696
(6) Sample: large firms (200 workers) −0.424 (0.078)∗∗∗ 2005:1–2011:4 4,257,803
(7) Sample: small firms (5–199 workers) −0.470 (0.068)∗∗∗ 2005:1–2011:4 9,268,264
Each coefficient is a separate second stage regression of the estimated year-quarter coefficients on the
yearly-lagged quarterly unemployment rate. All second stage regressions include a constant term, a linear
time trend and quarter indicators. Rows (1) and (2) contain 32 quarterly observations (2004:1–2011:4),
rows (4) and (5) contain 64 quarterly observations (1996:1–2011:4), rows (6) and (7) have 28 quarterly
observations (2005:1–2011:4) and row (3) has 96 quarterly observations (1988:1 to 2011:4). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels
expansionary periods given their greater bargaining power. Overall, the cyclicality dif-
ference between the baseline estimate and the one using only uncensored observations
confirms the need to address the censoring issue in mcvl.
Next, I examine real wage cyclicality for workers under different contract types.
Rows (4) and (5) in Table 3 show that wage cyclicality of workers under a tempo-
rary contract exceeds that of workers under a permanent contract by a factor of two.
Workers under permanent contracts enjoy higher levels of employment protection and
are more likely to benefit from collective agreements that include wage indexation
clauses. In contrast, workers with temporary contracts face a much higher level of
real wage cyclicality that is similar to workers in countries with more flexible labour
markets.
Finally, I analyze how real wage cyclicality varies by firm size. As mentioned
in Sect. 2, the wage bargaining process mostly occurs at the sectoral level with the
exception of large firms that often maintain firm-level agreements. The mcvl provides
information on the number of workers in the establishment but only for existing firms in
each mcvl wave, i.e., this information is not available for establishments that exited
before 2005.25 In rows (6) and (7) I estimate real wage cyclicality for workers in
large establishments (200 or more workers) and for workers in smaller establishments
(5–199 workers). Although the point estimate suggests that workers in large firms
experience a lower level of real wage cyclicality, the difference between both estimates
is not statistically significant.
25 Also, given that there is no unique identifier for firms with several establishments across provinces, some
establishments with a small number of workers may actually belong to large firms.
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Newly-hired workers −0.691 (0.058)∗∗∗ −0.614 (0.057)∗∗∗ −0.689 (0.059)∗∗∗
Job-movers −0.505 (0.054)∗∗∗ −0.501 (0.054)∗∗∗ −0.497 (0.054)∗∗∗
1–2 years −0.532 (0.057)∗∗∗ −0.507 (0.057)∗∗∗ −0.532 (0.058)∗∗∗
2–4 years −0.358 (0.053)∗∗∗ −0.338 (0.053)∗∗∗ −0.357 (0.053)∗∗∗
4–6 years −0.293 (0.045)∗∗∗ −0.273 (0.044)∗∗∗ −0.293 (0.044)∗∗∗
More than 6 years −0.225 (0.039)∗∗∗ −0.215 (0.039)∗∗∗ −0.227 (0.038)∗∗∗
Observations (first stage) 32,929,823 32,440,539 30,343,084
Lagged unemployment rate (levels) Yes Yes Yes
Each coefficient is a separate second stage regression of the estimated interaction between tenure category
and year-quarter coefficients on the yearly-lagged quarterly unemployment rate. All second stage regressions
have 96 quarterly observations (1988:1 to 2011:4) and include a constant term, a linear time trend and quarter
indicators. I randomly drop 40 % of observations in the first stage given the large number of coefficients
that need to be estimated. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels
Wage cyclicality by tenure category
The employer–employee setup in mcvl allows to estimate wage cyclicality for stayers
within a match. Also, in contrast to other data sets, newly-hired workers and job-
movers can be detected with more precision. In Table 4 I estimate real wage cyclicality
for the tenure categories described in Sect. 3. For this purpose, I modify Eq. (5) by
including indicators for tenure categories and interactions between these indicators and
year-quarter indicators. Now, the second stage (Eq. 6) regresses the estimated year-
quarter indicator coefficients for each tenure category on the yearly-lagged quarterly
unemployment rate.
Column (1) presents cyclicality measures using the first job tenure classification,
i.e., a worker accumulates tenure in a job and keeps that level if he eventually returns
in the future. Real wage cyclicality declines consistently with level of tenure. For
instance, a drop of one percentage point in the unemployment rate is associated with
a 0.69 % increase in wages for newly-hired workers, a smaller increase of 0.36 % for
workers with tenure between 2 and 4 years, and an even smaller increase of 0.23 % for
workers with more than 6 years of tenure. In column (2) I use the alternative job tenure
classification in which all returns to previous jobs are classified as new spells. The
cyclicality estimates decline also with the level of tenure but are slightly lower than
those in column (1), particularly for newly-hired workers. Therefore, when comparing
both estimates, real wage cyclicality is, as expected, greater for newly-hired workers
who start a new job in which they have not acquired any level of tenure in the past.
I have performed several alternative estimations. In column (3) I restrict the sample
of newly-hireds and job-movers to those who do not migrate across provinces—recall
establishment identifiers are unique within a province but a main firm identifier is not
provided. In this way, I eliminate newly-hired and job-mover spells that may actually
correspond to within-firm relocations. The estimated semi-elasticities for both newly-
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hireds and job movers remain unaffected. In another estimation (not shown), I have
limited duration of newly-hired and job-mover spells to three months while including
a separate tenure category between 4 months and 1 year. The estimated cyclicality
levels for newly-hired workers and job-movers are virtually identical. Lastly, results
in the second stage regression for newly-hired workers do not drop substantially if I
replace the yearly-lagged quarterly unemployment rate by the current unemployment
rate. The estimated real wage cyclicality falls only by 15 % while it declines by almost
half for workers with more than 6 years of tenure. Thus, newly-hired workers appear
to be the group that is most affected by current economic conditions.
Overall, the wages of workers who enter new jobs or matches—specially newly-
hireds or those who come from periods of unemployment or inactivity—are the ones
more exposed to the economic cycle. This is consistent with the evidence summarized
in Pissarides (2009) and the findings of Haefke et al. (2013). However, the magnitude
of the response again does not lie in the range of earlier estimates. A consensus estimate
is that a percentage point decline in the unemployment rate is related to a real wage
increment in new matches of 3 %. Hence, the cyclicality estimate I find for newly-
hired workers is much lower than the level found for other countries, though it is still
substantially larger than the wage cyclicality of stayers.
Cyclicality of the net present values of wages
The available estimates of wages in new matches being more cyclical than wages of
job stayers have contributed to the discussion of wage rigidities and fluctuations of
unemployment and vacancies along the cycle. Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) argue
that the Mortensen-Pissarides canonical search and matching model can not account
for the observed cyclical volatility of unemployment and vacancies. They propose
wage rigidity as a potential solution to this so called unemployment-volatility puzzle
(Pissarides 2009).
Pissarides (2009) shows that the wage flexibility that is relevant for the model to
amplify unemployment fluctuations is the one in new matches. In fact, in this model,
the job creation condition depends on the difference between the expected productivity
and cost of labour in new matches, while the level of wage flexibility in ongoing jobs
becomes irrelevant. Using available estimates of the cyclicality in new matches, he
concludes that wages in new matches are as cyclical as productivity. However, given
that job creation is a forward-looking decision, the statistic that is of real interest is
not necessarily the wage cyclicality in new matches but the one in the net present of
value of wages over the duration of these new matches.
To this end, I calculate the net present value (npv) of wages for each new match
in period t by adding up discounted wages along the duration of the match. I use
an annual discount rate of 5 %. However, the npv of wages for matches of different
duration can not be compared directly. For this reason, I calculate both the equivalent
annuity, i.e., the equivalent monthly wage along the duration of the match, and the npv
of wages divided by its duration. Then, I proceed to estimate the cyclicality of these
measures using the two-stage method described in Eqs. (5) and (6), but replacing log
wages in the first stage by any of the two net present values. In this setup I still address
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(1) npv of wages: equivalent
monthly wage
−0.766 (0.097)∗∗∗ −0.625 (0.093)∗∗∗




Each coefficient is a separate second stage regression of the estimated year-quarter coefficients on the
yearly-lagged quarterly unemployment rate. All second stage regressions include a constant term, a linear
time trend and quarter indicators. The first column contains 96 quarterly observations (1988:1–2011:4) and
the second column contains 60 quarterly observations (1988:1–2002:4). The number of observations in the
first stage is 1,677,664 for rows (1) and (2). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels
compositional effects along the cycle by including worker fixed-effects, yet, now the
estimation drops those workers who do not switch jobs throughout 1988–2011.26
Table 5 presents the results of the estimation. The npv of equivalent wages in new
matches is as cyclical as wages of newly-hired workers and somewhat higher than
wages of job-movers. In general, a decline of one percentage point in the unemploy-
ment rate is associated with an increase in the npv of equivalent wages in a new
match of 0.65 %–0.77 %. When I restrict the sample in column (2) to matches created
before 2002 to address right censoring in job durations, I obtain a slightly smaller
semi-elasticity.27 This finding resembles that of Haefke et al. (2013) who obtain using
cps data an essentially identical response for both wages of newly-hireds and npv of
wages to changes in productivity. In contrast, Kudlyak (2013) finds evidence of greater
cyclicality of npv of wages relative to wages of newly-hired workers using nlsy data.
The main difference between my findings and the estimates in these studies is that I
exploit actual match-specific data on wages and job durations and, hence, there is no
need to simulate the profile of matches.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides estimates of real wage cyclicality in Spain during the period
1988–2011. The baseline estimate shows wages are weakly procyclical with a small
increment of 0.4 % in response to a decline of one percentage point in the unem-
ployment rate. Earlier studies that estimate wage cyclicality using worker-level data
find much stronger wage responses for countries with more flexible labour markets,
mainly the United States and the United Kingdom. Therefore, this finding indicates
26 Of the 513,058 workers in the initial sample, 71,382 (13.9 %) do not switch jobs during the estimation
period.
27 The 90th percentile in the distribution of job durations of new matches between 1988–2002 (and further
observed until 2011) is 99 months. Thus, I get rid of almost all right censoring in durations when applying
this restriction.
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that in countries with institutions that deter firms to adjust wages to business cycle
conditions—Spain being one good example—real wage cyclicality is weaker than
previously thought.
The result I find on different wage cyclicality estimates for workers under perma-
nent and temporary contracts mirrors the duality in the Spanish labour market. The
estimated real wage cyclicality for workers under a temporary contract is twice as
large as the cyclicality level for workers under a permanent contract. Although I do
not examine differences in extensive margin cyclical responses between workers in
permanent and temporary contracts, it has been documented that the latter also face
higher turnover rates (Dolado et al. 2002). Therefore, policies in favour of reduc-
ing disparities between workers under both types of contract should generate a more
balanced response of wages to business cycles conditions for both types of workers.
Finally, I provide evidence that wage cyclicality decreases consistently with the
level of job tenure. The finding that wages of newly-hired workers are more volatile
than wages of job stayers does not support wage rigidity as a solution to the
unemployment-volatility puzzle. In the Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching
model the key piece of information to determine the number of jobs created is the
cyclicality of the net present value of wages in new matches. Using actual match-
specific data on wages and job durations, I obtain a cyclicality estimate for this net
present value of wages in new matches of the same order as the one I find for wages
of newly-hired workers.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
Appendix: Fit of simulated earnings
To examine the fit of the simulation, I compare the distribution of simulated daily
wages from mcvl to the distribution of actual uncensored daily earnings from income
tax returns for the same individual and month in those years where both are available
(2004–2011). If the fit is reasonably close for 2004–2011, this will provide some
Table 6 Selected percentiles for actual and simulated wages
All workers Skilled workers
Total salaries Simulated wages Total salaries Simulated wages
Percentile 10 53.2 52.8 45.2 46.2
Percentile 25 62.5 62.2 60.2 62.0
Percentile 50 79.0 78.8 85.0 88.1
Percentile 75 114.0 116.1 123.4 129.7
Percentile 90 169.9 175.9 172.8 168.6
Monthly salaries and wages expressed as a percentage of the average in each category. Skilled individuals
work in the top three out of ten social security occupations
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Table 7 Order of
autocorrelations for
actual and simulated wages








validation that the distribution of simulated wages can accurately approximate the
distribution of earnings or total salaries for the years 1988–2003.
The correlation between simulated daily wages and actual daily total salaries for
capped observations is high at 0.77. Simulated wages can reproduce to some extent the
overall shape of the salaries distribution. This can be seen in Table 6, which presents
selected percentiles of the distributions of total salaries and simulated wages for all
workers and for skilled workers (those in the top three occupation categories in social
security). Overall, the distributions are quite similar, though simulated wages exceed
total salaries in the 90th percentile. More important, for skilled workers, who are
top-coded beyond the 52nd percentile, simulated wages can approximate salaries in
capped percentiles.
Table 7 displays estimated order of autocorrelations for total salaries and simulated
wages. In this case, the level of persistence observed in both total salaries and wages
in mcvl is remarkably similar.
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